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Abstract 
 
We use a difference-in-differences design to estimate the causal impact 
of the adoption of dry laws in the São Paulo Metropolitan Area 
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1. Introduction 
 
      The empirical literature shows that alcohol consumption causes all sorts of social maladies. In 
this article, we study the impact of social consumption of alcohol on murder, the utmost form violence.  
Specifically, we estimate the causal effect on homicide of restricting the recreational consumption of 
alcohol, which are mandatory night closing hours for bars and restaurants (dry laws, hereafter).  
We evaluate the impact of dry laws on homicides by taking advantage of a unique empirical 
opportunity. Between March-2001 and August-2004, 16 out of 39 municipalities in the São Paulo 
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Metropolitan Area (SPMA, hereafter) adopted dry laws. We estimate the reduced form effect of dry 
laws and find that they cause a 10% drop in homicides. Similar impacts are found on battery and 
deaths by car accident.  
Our article relates to several pieces of literature. First, and rather generally, our results pertain 
to the literature on alcohol consumption and violence. Experimental studies in psychology suggest that 
alcohol suppresses inhibition, impairs judgment and induces aggressive behaviour (McClelland et al 
(1972)). However, the literature with non-experimental data has had difficulty documenting a 
convincing link. Omission of common determinants such as child abuse and mental problems is one 
issue (see Currie and Terkin (2006) on child abuse and alcohol consumption). Non-random selection 
plagues studies that use arrest or victim data because sober offenders or victims are less likely to get 
caught or be victimized (Martin (2001)). Overall, the epidemiological literature has not settled the 
issue of causality (Lipsey et al (1997)). 
In this context of weak documentation of the causal effects of alcohol consumption, our work 
relates to a few recent articles that employ sharper identification strategies. Arguably, the most 
convincing work is Carpenter and Dobkin (forthcoming). They exploit the exogenous variation 
provided by the 21-year-old legal drinking age in the US to show that alcohol consumption causes car 
accident deaths and youth suicide. The cost of their high internal validity is loosing some external 
validity: the result concerns only youth drinking. In addition, they do not look at violent crime. 
Somewhat different from our results, Carpenter (2007) finds that youth drinking increases property 
crime but has no impact on violent crime.  
The contrast between results in Carpenter (2007) and ours may be due to the fact that the 
SPMA dry laws only restrict the recreational consumption of alcohol. As expected, such restrictions 
caused a reduction in bar consumption only partially substituted by consumption at home. At bars, 
mental impairment and reduction of inhibition combine with altercations that less than rarely grow into 
fights. Settling scores when intoxicated is perhaps the perfect recipe for disaster. Additionally, there is 
less reason to believe that the impact of social consumption of alcohol on property crime is stronger 
than alcohol consumption in general.  
Previous empirical evidence on the link from social consumption to violence is unconvincing. 
Stockwell et al (1993), in a survey of Western Australian adults, found that bars were the preferred 
venue of alcohol consumption prior to committing violent crimes. But bars could be preferred venue in 
general. Roncek and Maier (1991) and Scribner et al (1995) find similar results in other empirical 
settings (see Martin (2001) for a survey). In contrast, Gorman et al (1998), using data on New Jersey   3
cities, cannot link bar density to crime after controlling for demographics. These articles employ only 
cross-section variation and thus cannot convincingly control for common determinants of bar presence 
and violence. Directly related to our article is Duailibi et al (2007), which uses only time-series 
variation from Diadema, one of the 16 adopting cities in our sample. Their results are in line with ours, 
but they cannot infer causality because of the lack of cross-section variation in adoption. With a 
difference-in-differences design, we have a sharper identification strategy. 
Even if a causal link from alcohol (not necessarily consumed socially) to violence was well 
established, policy implications are equivocal. The economics of crime literature paints an ambiguous 
picture of outright prohibition and taxation. On the one hand, Miron and Zwiebel (1991, 1995), for 
instance, argue that prohibition does not reduce alcohol consumption. Miron (1998) also argue that 
price oriented interventions (e.g., taxation) are equally ineffective because the price-elasticity of the 
demand for alcohol is (presumably) quite inelastic. On the other hand, some researchers estimate that 
alcohol consumption is sensitive to prices (Grossman at al (1993); Chaloupka et al (2002); Cook and 
Moore (2002)), although normally the elasticity is less than 1 in modulus. Perhaps reflecting the 
relative inefficacy of taxation, Markowitz (2005) finds puzzling results using victimization data: higher 
beer taxes reduce assaults but has no impact on rape, a set of result hard to rationalize. In addition, 
making alcohol illegal altogether has perverse effects. One is violence induced by the impossibility of 
settling contracts through the formal judicial system (Miron and Zweibel (1991, 1995)). Another is a 
substitution effect: illegality levels alcohol with illicit psychotropic and reduces the relative price of 
moving to “stronger” drugs (Thornton (1998)). Colin et al (2005) use county-level variation in alcohol 
consumption prohibition in Texas to show that access to alcohol reduces crime associated with illicit 
drugs. Nevertheless, the consequences of this “substitution effect” for policy are unclear: should we 
facilitate the access to alcohol in order to fight drug use? 
In light of this evidence, targeted sales restrictions are interesting from a policy perspective. 
Because dry laws are less radical than prohibition, they are less likely to trigger substitution effects and 
contract-enforcement crime. Because they are focused at circumstances in which the effects of alcohol 
are magnified by social interaction, dry laws are relatively economical from a welfare perspective. 
Figure 1 summarizes the story of the article. Not surprisingly, adopting cities were more violent 
than non-adopting before adoption, but homicides were dropping at about the same rate before 
adoption. Around the year 2002, when most cities adopted the dry law (see table 1), homicides started 
to drop much faster in adopting cities. While in 2001 homicides in adopting were 15% higher than in 
non-adopting cities, rates were the same in 2004.    4
Is figure 1 indisputable evidence that dry laws caused a reduction on homicides? The answer is 
no because adoption is a choice of cities. Adopting cities may have implemented other crime-fighting 
policies, which is all more likely because adoption occurred in violent cities. We do control for a long 
list of “other suspects”, but it is always possible that dry law is confounded with other unobserved 
policies. Furthermore, adopting and non-adopting cities may differ in time-varying dimensions. For 
example, homicides could be following different secular trends prior to adoption, although figure 1 
suggests otherwise. Finally, mean reversion could produce the results mechanically. 
The article is organized as follows. Information on data sources is in Section 2. Section 3 
describes the empirical setting and narrates the chronology of the events. Section 4 contains an 
extensive description of the empirical strategy designed to address the difficulties raised by the non-
random adoption of dry laws.  Results are presented in section 5, which also contains an extensive 
robustness analysis, as well as validation and falsification tests. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Data 
 
Data come from several sources. Crime and enforcement data are from the Secretaria Estadual 
de Segurança Pública de São Paulo (Secretaria hereafter), the state-level enforcement authority. Crime 
data are at the monthly frequency. Homicides and vehicle robbery data run from Apr-1999 through 
Dec-2004. Other crime categories are available from Jan-2001. Police, incarceration and arms 
apprehension data are only available with annual frequency and starting in 2001. Deaths by car 
accidents are from DATASUS, a hospital database from the Ministry of Health. 
Also from Secretaria, we have report-level data from INFOCRIM, a compustat crime-tracking 
system. INFOCRIM started in 1999 in the São Paulo City. Implementation in other cities in the SPMA 
was gradual, as precincts were slowly incorporated in the system. Cities enter the sample as 
INFOCRIM was implemented at its precincts but not all precincts within a city enter at the same time. 
Thus levels are not comparable over time. Still, with INFOCRIM we can compute the distribution of 
crime during the day, which is useful for corroboration purposes. 
Although crime data usually suffer from under-reporting, our two main dependent variables – 
homicide and vehicle robbery – are well measured. Under-reporting is negligible for homicides   5
because an investigation is mandatory as long as a body is produced.
1 Vehicle robbery is well 
measured for three reasons: avoiding receiving traffic tickets; avoiding having one’s name involved in 
criminal activities related to the subsequent use of a stolen car; and for insurance purposes.  
A small digression on under-reporting is in place because we use other crime categories such as 
battery as corroborative evidence. Most crime statistics suffer from serious under-reporting in Brazil, 
stemming from historical lack of confidence in authorities. Under-reporting per se does not invalidate 
the use of other categories, but extra caution must be exercised because reporting improved over the 
sample period. Institutional innovations in the state-level bureaucracy reduced the costs of reporting. 
Among them are: i) the creation of Poupa-Tempo, whose claque is “time-saver”,  which are offices 
where all bureaucratic errands, including reporting crimes, may be done; ii) Delegacia Eletrônica 
(electronic police station) for on-line reporting; and iii) Delegacias da Mulher, police stations 
specialized in domestic violence.  
Recorded crime rates hint that reporting improved over time. Figure 2 shows three categories: 
homicides, vehicle theft/robbery and common theft/robbery (all except vehicle). In 1999 vehicle and 
common theft/robbery rates were similar, an evidence of under-reporting. In the US, recorded common 
theft/robbery is three times higher than vehicle theft/robbery (Uniform Crime Report, 2006, FBI).  
Overtime, homicides and vehicle theft/robbery follow a similar pattern of reduction, reflecting the 
general drop in crime in the SPMA (see section 3). In contrast, common theft/robbery increased during 
the period, which is hard to rationalize except for improvements in reporting. 
An additional problem is that reporting did not improve simultaneously across cities. Poupa-
Tempo started in São Paulo City. Delegacia Eletrônica was available across the state, but internet 
penetration varied wildly both across cities and over time. For all these reasons, under-reported 
categories are used only as additional evidence and with caution. 
Demographic data are from Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (IBGE), the Brazilian 
Bureau of Statistics. We have annual city-level income per capita, population and male population in 
ages 15 to 30 years, which are interpolated to obtain monthly frequencies. From Fundação SEADE, a 
state government think-tank, comes information on municipal-level policies such as the date of 
establishment of a municipal police force (if any), its size, spending on education and welfare, and the 
                                                 
 
1 Homicides are attributed to a city if the crime was committed in that city (or if the dead body was found within the city limits and the 
investigation cannot determine where the crime was committed). Some “miscoding” happens because the dead body could be moved. 
Except for very elaborate stories, this only introduces noise in the homicide data. Incidentally, reporting is mandatory in the case of 
deaths by car accident.   6
creation date of a municipal secretary of justice (if any). Information on the dry laws comes from the 
text of the law, which we collected on-line or requested from the city council by telephone.  
Alcohol consumption data are from Pesquisa de Orçamento Familiar (POF, hereafter), a 
household income and consumption survey conducted by IBGE. POF was conducted twice: 1995/6 
and 2002/3. 13 municipalities enacted the law between Mar-2001 and Jul-2003, and 89% of the 
adopting cities’ population was in cities that adopted before Jan-2003 (see table 1). Thus, most dry 
laws were effective when interviews were conducted. POF has consumption by type of outlet, i.e., bars 
and restaurants versus supermarkets and grocery stores, allowing us to measure not only the impact of 
the dry laws on bar consumption, but also substitution effects from bar to supermarket purchases. One 
caveat is that the public file does not identify the municipality where the household in located, only 
whether the household is located at the São Paulo City or at any other municipality in the SPMA. Still, 
we can compare a group of cities that contains adopting cities to a group without adopting cities.  
 
3. The Empirical Setting and the Chronology of Events 
 
With roughly 19 million inhabitants in 2005, the SPMA is the largest contiguous urban area in 
South America, and the third largest worldwide. Politically, it is defined as an administrative region in 
the state of São Paulo. It is composed of 39 independent municipalities, each with its own mayor and 
city council. City sizes vary widely, from Santa Isabel with a population of 11,000 to São Paulo City 
with its 11 million inhabitants in 2005. 
Despite a recent reduction in crime, the SPMA is a violent place. In our 69-month sample, 
more than 45,000 people were murdered, which gives a monthly rate of 3.65 homicides per 100thd 
inhabitants. For comparison, in New York City at its 1990 peak the rate was 3.56. Figure 1 shows 
homicides increasing steadily through the 1990s and reaching a peak in 1999. Since then they fell 
sharply, a reversion comparable to that of New York in the 1990s.  Several factors contributed to this 
reversion. For example, De Mello and Schneider (2007) show the role demography: the proportion of 
youngsters rose in the 1990s and a fell in the 2000s.  
In reaction to the sharp increase in crime during the 1990s policy interventions took place at 
every level of government. The most famous are: (i) the Lei do Desarmamento (LD) (Dec-2003), a 
strict federal legislation on firearms’ possession; and (ii) INFOCRIM, a compustat-like system that 
improved police intelligence at the state level. It is likely that both contributed to the decline in 
homicide depicted in figures 1 and 2 (see Marinho de Sousa et al (2007) on the impact of the LD). For   7
our purposes, however, the relevant fact is that that these policy interventions cannot be confounded 
with the dry laws because they were either too broad (LD) or too restricted (INFOCRIM). 
Municipalities have jurisdiction over the regulation of local commerce. This allowed Barueri to 
pass in Mar-2001 a legislation imposing mandatory closing hours for bars and restaurants, from 11PM 
to 6AM all week long. The law allowed for exceptions under certain circumstances. In Barueri, less 
than 60 bars and restaurants out of roughly 4,000 were exempt.
2 Several cities followed suit and, as of 
Dec-2004, 16 out of 39 cities in the SPMA had adopted similar legislation. Table 1 has the adoption 
dates, the closing hours and the population in 2004 for all adopting cities. Figure 3 depicts the 
geographical distribution of adoption. Laws varied somewhat in strictness, with a few adopting cities 
having laxer rules during weekends. Still, 71.68% of the population in adopting cities were in 
municipalities where the curfew at 11pm was in place all week, and only Osasco has a midnight 
curfew during weekdays. Adopting cities’ population was 3.2 million in 2004, representing 17% of the 
SPMA (40% excluding São Paulo City). Prior to dry laws, no restrictions in opening hours were in 
place. Bars typically worked on “last client served” basis and opened between 6am and 7am. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the laws worked. One newspaper story is illustrative. The 
owner of a bar in Diadema, a particularly violent adopting city, reports that “…before [adoption] it was 
a little messy here. The law is good because it avoids fights.”
3 
In weak institutional settings such as Brazil, it is not obvious that dry laws were actually 
enforced, i.e., whether bar consumption of alcohol dropped following of adoption. For example, 
Romano et at (2007) find that despite the minimum drinking (18 years old) adolescents find it easy to 
purchase alcohol. Anecdotal evidence again suggests that the laws were effective. In the same 
newspaper story, the husband of the bar owner reports that “…sales have fallen after the law was 
passed”. We confirm this anecdotal evidence using household consumption data. We measure the 
impact of dry law on the consumption of two alcoholic beverages: beer and cachaça, which represent 
roughly 82% of total alcohol consumption in value (figures are from POF).
4 The model is: 
 
      it it t i t i it CONTROLS SPMA SPMA Alcohol ε γ γ γ γ + Σ + × + + + = 2003 2003 3 2 1 0      (1) 
                                                 
 
2 Conditions for exemption included not being located near schools, being outside “crime zones” or zones without nuisance 
complaints. The presence of acoustic isolation and of private security in front of bar was also a necessary condition. See 
http://www.propagandasembebida.org.br, in Portuguese. 
3 This story is at Globo Online, the electronic version of O Globo, the second largest circulation newspaper in Brazil. In Portuguese at 
http://g1.globo.com/Noticias/SaoPaulo/0,,AA1359613-5605,00.html. The Economist, 10/20/2005, reporting a story on Diadema, lists dry 
laws as an important factor contributing for the decline in murder rates starting in 2001. In an interview to O Globo, Barueri's Municipal 
Secretary of Communication claims that homicides "fell up to 70%" after the city implemented the dry law. 
4 Cachaça is the national liquor, distilled from fermented sugar cane. Its alcohol strength ranges from 38%/Vol. to 48%/Vol.   8
 
where SPMAi is 1 if household i lived in the SPMA excluding the city of São Paulo, 0 otherwise. 2003t 
is 1 if the interview was done in the 2002-2003 POF, 0 otherwise. Controls include gender, age, years 
of schooling and household income of the respondent. Alcoholit is the total household consumption in 
bars or in grocery stores, in reais (R$). We use sampling weights to make observations representative 
of the population. Estimated standard errors should be viewed with caution because we only have three 
cross-section units and thus we lack degrees of freedom to estimate the standard errors properly (see 
Donald and Lang (2007)). With this caveat in mind, we proceed to interpret results in table 2. 
Columns (1) and (3) show the impact of dry law adoption on alcohol consumption. Monthly 
household consumption of beer drops by R$28, which represents 70% of the average bar consumption. 
For cachaça, the drop is R$2.2, which represents 58% of the mean household bar consumption. Since 
male youngsters are the main perpetrators of homicides, we restrict the sample to households headed 
by males age 15 – 30. Results are similar (columns (5) and (6)). In columns (2) and (4) we measure 
possible substitution effects. For beer there is a substitution effect smaller than the direct effect: 
consumption in stores increases by R$11. For cachaça, no substitution effect arises, confirming the 
perception that cachaça is bar drink. In summary, household data show that dry laws reduced bar 
consumption, with a small substitution for grocery purchases in the case of beer. 
 
4. The Empirical Strategy 
 
Our identification strategy hinges on six pillars. First, with a difference-in-differences strategy 
we control for all time-invariant heterogeneity across cities, a necessary condition for causal inference. 
Several common determinants of crime and alcohol (ab)use – such as child abuse, poverty and 
psychological disturbances – are not observable and remain fairly constant over short periods of time. 
Second, the staggered nature of adoption provides additional identifying variation. Different adoption 
periods allow us to compare early adopting cities with late adopting cities, mitigating the problems 
posed by endogenous adoption. Third, dry laws should have different impacts on different types of 
crimes. Thus, other crime categories provide the basis for validation and falsification tests. Fourth, if 
dry laws have an impact on homicides, then the distribution of homicides during the day must have 
changed in response to the restriction in bar opening hours. Fifth, we evaluate the empirical 
determinants of the adoption of dry laws and show that adoption of dry laws is not explained by the   9
adoption of other observable municipal and state level policies. Finally, we conduct an extensive 
sensitivity analysis to probe the robustness of our results. 
 
4.1 Summary statistics: Adopting and Non-Adopting Cities 
 
Summary statistics on adopting and non-adopting cities are in table 3. Observations are 
weighted by city population. Non-adopting cities resemble adopting in demographics, a desirable 
feature of a control group. They have similar percentages of male population between 15 and 30 years 
old, income per capita and school attainment measured both by the number of years of schooling and 
by the high-school drop-out rate. Non-adopting cities seem larger than adopting ones, but the 
difference is due to São Paulo City, which represents roughly 60% of the population of the SPMA. 
Excluding São Paulo, average population is similar across groups. 
Average characteristics may disguise time-series heterogeneity. For a clean, seasonality-free 
pre and post treatment periods comparison, we use the six-month periods Jul-1999/Dec-1999 and July-
2004/Dec-2004 for homicides, vehicle robbery, deaths by car accidents, and the demographics.
5 For 
the other crime categories we compare six-month periods Jul-2001/Dec-2001 and Jul-2004/Dec-2004, 
and drop Barueri and Jandira, who adopted in 2001.  
Start with the demographics. Nominal per capita income rose by 31% and 27% in adopting and 
non-adopting cities, respectively. The proportion of population in the crime-prime age (male in the 15-
30 age bracket) dropped by the same magnitude in both groups. Population growth is also similar. 
Excluding São Paulo City from the non-adopting group does not change any conclusion. 
Homicides evolved differently in the adopting and non-adopting cities. In the post-adoption 
period, the average six-month rate was 2.24 in adopting cities. This is 54% lower than the 4.83 rate in 
July-1999 to Dec-1999. In non-adopting cities the reduction was less pronounced: 44%. Reported 
battery rates increased in the SPMA area as a whole. In adopting cities, however, they fell slightly, 
suggesting that dry laws also had an impact on assault. Finally, while deaths by car accident dropped 
markedly in adopting cities, they stayed flat in non-adopting ones. Results are not sensitive to the 
presence of the São Paulo City in the non-adopting group. In line with figure 1, pre and post treatment 
average comparison suggest that dry laws reduced the violent crime and deaths by car accident. 
                                                 
 
5 We drop the observation from Poá in Jul-04 when computing the post-adoption means for adopting cities because Poá 
adopted in Aug-04.   10
In contrast, no marked pre-post difference arises for the bank, cargo and vehicle robbery. We 
argue below that one should not expect these categories to be affected by the dry law. In fact we will 
use them as falsification tests. 
Before proceeding to confirm the suggestion of the difference in means, we do an in depth 
investigation of the determinants of the decision to adopt the dry law.  
 
    4.2 Investigating the decision to adopt the law 
     
Endogenous adoption of dry laws poses two threats to causal inference. First, if adoption 
occurred in reaction to surges in homicides, then it is likely that other unobserved policies were 
adopted concurrently. Second, if observed policies explain dry law adoption, then it is likely that all 
policies – observed and unobserved - were adopted in bundle. We estimate a duration model for the 
probability of transiting from non-adoption to adoption and evaluate the empirical relevance of the two 
threats (see Jenkins (1995)).  The following factors are included in the duration analysis: 
•  Municipal and state-level policy variables. Policies are divided into two sets: a) municipal 
enforcement policies, such as the presence of a municipal secretary of justice, of a municipal 
police force, their adoption time if they were established during the sample period, and the size 
(in personnel) of the municipal police force, and policy choices that are arguably related to 
crime prevention, such as the municipal expenditures on welfare (social assistance), education, 
and cultural activities; b) state-level enforcement variables (at the city level): number of police 
officers per capita, arrests per capita and firearms apprehended per capita. By constitutional 
mandate, enforcement is mostly done at the state-level in Brazil. 
•  Recent dynamics of homicide. This allows us to test the hypothesis that dry law adoption was 
related to recent shocks to homicides. We also include the average homicides in 2000 as a 
baseline measure of homicides to evaluate if overall violence affects the decision to adopt. 
•  Demographic controls. Income, population and male population between 15 and 30 are 
included because they may affect homicides and the decision to adopt dry laws (a younger 
constituency may oppose the adoption). In some specifications a polynomial of time is included 
to account for time varying hazard rates. Adoption occurs over time and homicides are 
declining in the sample period.  
•  Number of adopting neighbours. Figure 3 shows that adoption is clustered geographically, 
suggesting that emulation or fear of spillover effects may be important drivers of adoption.   11
Table 4 has the results. The first column has the results of a stripped-down model. Neither the 
dynamics of homicide nor competing municipal or state-level policies are included.
6 In line with 
descriptive statistics, demographics are unrelated to the adoption of dry laws. Time explains adoption, 
but only weakly (the p – value on log(time) is 22.2%). Base line homicides in 2000 increase the hazard 
rate of adoption, i.e., more violent cities were more prone to adopt earlier. Finally, the number of 
adopting neighbours explains adoption. Taken together, these variables explain less than 9% of 
variation in the timing of adoption. In column (2) we include the municipal and state-level policies, the 
competing explanations. Only the size of the state police force has an impact on adoption. However, it 
has the wrong sign: an increase in the number of state police officers in the city retards adoption. In 
column (3) the lags of homicide are included. They are neither individually nor jointly significant. 
Relative to column (2), the dynamics of homicides explain only one additional percentage point of the 
variation in adoption. Thus, dry law adoption did not occur as a reaction to a recent increase in 
homicides. In column (4) we exclude all policy variables. They explain no more than 6% of the 
variation in adoption above and beyond the variables included in column (3). Lastly, the model in 
column (5) excludes the base line homicides. The dynamics of homicide are still unrelated to adoption.  
We interpret these results as follows. Violent cities adopted dry laws as a measure to fight 
crime and neighbours followed suit, perhaps because of anecdotal evidence that dry laws worked or for 
fear of spillovers. Thus, the two threats posed by endogenous adoption are not relevant empirically. 
 
4.3 The Empirical Model 
 
We estimate several version of the following model:     
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where i is a city in the SPMA, and t is a month.  AdoptLawit is a dummy variable that assumes the 
value 1 if the dry law was in place in city i at period t, and 0 otherwise. Hence, for non-adopting cities, 
                                                 
 
6 The sample is restricted to the period Jan-2001 through Dec-2004 to include the state-level enforcement variables. Although we loose 
observations between Jan-1999 and Dec-200, no adoption occurred during this period. Thus, for the duration model it does not make 
much difference if we include 1999 and 2000 since adoption occurred in this period.   12
it assumes only the value 0. We test whether the parameter β1 is negative, i.e., whether dry laws 
reduced homicides. Montht is a full set of period dummies. Their inclusion is important because 
homicides were falling in the SPMA as a whole. If period specific effects are not accounted for, 
AdoptLawit will capture aggregate shocks because it assumes more values 1 at the end of the sample 
period. Cityi is a full set of city dummies to control for city fixed-effects.  
  Although model (2) discards all pure cross-sectional and time-series variation, objections to 
causal interpretation still arise. First, the procedure does not account for all time-varying heterogeneity, 
which is true in any policy evaluation but poses a more serious threat when policy adoption is a choice. 
  Controlsit are the most direct way to account for time-varying heterogeneity. They include 
income, population and the percentage of population between 15 and 30 years, a problematic age 
bracket. These demographic variables affect homicide and are observed at the annual frequency.  
Figure 1 suggests that results are not driven different secular trends in homicides. Nevertheless, 
we play it safe and we implement two procedures to account for this possibility. In most specifications 
Controlsit includes several lags of the homicide as explanatory variables. We have no specific 
theoretical reason to believe that past homicides cause present homicides, after time and city dummies 
are included. However, a rich dynamic model serves the dual purpose of controlling for different 
secular trends and proxying for possible unobserved policy reactions. Alternatively, we estimate a 
“city-specific trends” model in which each city has its own linear trend θit.  
Finally, Controlsit also includes a long list of policies that may compete with dry laws. They are 
the same in the duration model: (i) municipal spending in education and welfare, the presence of a 
municipal secretary of justice, the presence of a municipal police force and its size (if any); (ii) state-
level enforcement variables, which are the size of the police force in the city, the number of arrests and 
the number of guns apprehended. The state-level enforcement variables are particularly important 
because the state is the main law enforcer by constitutional mandate, and the empirical literature has 
established the link from enforcement to crime (see Marvell and Moody (1996); Corman and Mocan 
(2000); Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2004); Levitt (2002)). 
We weight observations by population, which serves two purposes. First, it emulates a 
regression at the individual level, i.e., weighting observations provides estimates closer to a random 
sample in the SPMA. Second, homicides are not a common occurrence and observations from small 
cities are much noisier than those from larger cities (the variance of εit decreases with population). 
Thus variation from smaller cities should be discounted. In order to avoid giving more weight to 
observations in the later part of the sample, the weight is the city population in 2000. Finally,   13
observations are clustered at the city level. Thus, all estimated standard errors are robust to within city 
correlation, an important feature in light of results in Bertrand et al (2004). 
 
5. Results  
 
5.1 Main Estimates 
 
Table 5 shows estimates of several versions of model (2). For conciseness, only  1 ˆ β  is reported. 
All models include a full set of city and period dummies. Start in panel A. Column (1) shows the 
estimates of a stripped-down model, with no controls besides period and city dummies. The estimated 
coefficient on the variable AdoptLaw ( 1 ˆ β ) is -0.616, and it is reasonably well estimated (p-value = 
5.73%). Considering the homicide rate in adopting cities in the period Jul-1999 through Dec-1999 
(4.83 in table 3), 616 . 0 ˆ
1 − = β  means a 13% drop in homicides per 100thd inhabitants, a significant 
reduction. In terms of lives, had the law been adopted in the city of São Paulo (10 million inhabitants), 
740 lives would have been saved annually (0.616×100×12). 
Results in columns (2) show that the estimated impact of dry law adoption is robust to the 
inclusion of controls. Although the estimated coefficient is a little smaller in magnitude (-0.490), it is 
still quite significant practically, and more precisely estimated (p – value  = 2.6%).  
In column (3) we restrict the sample to Jan-2001 through Dec-2004, the period for which we 
have data on the enforcement variables. Results are stronger than in column (2). In column (4) the 
enforcement variables are included. Results are, if anything, slightly stronger. Since including 
enforcement variables restrict the sample but does not change results significantly, our benchmark 
estimate is -0.490 (column (4)), the point estimate from the most complete model whose sample is full 
(May-1999 through Dec-2004). 
In panel B we restrict the sample to adopting cities. Since adoption did not occur 
simultaneously across cities, we may use the staggered nature of adoption as the source of identifying 
variation. The control group is now adopting cities before adoption. Restricting the attention to 
adopting cities involves a variance-bias trade-off. On the one hand, excluding non-adopting cities 
discards relevant variation and increases variance. On the other hand, restricting the sample to adopters 
reduces potential bias for two reasons. First, late adopters have a very high “propensity” to adopt, 
given that they eventually adopted. Thus, concentrating on them helps “homogenize” the control and   14
treatment groups. Second, it reduces the risk of capturing potential unobserved policies. It may be that 
late adopters adopted unobserved policies later, and the effects would still be confounded. However, 
the “unobserved policies bias” story now needs a very fine tuning of timing to work. Incidentally, 
when attention is restricted to adopting cities, São Paulo City is excluded. This is important for 
robustness purposes because observations are weighted by population and 60% of the population of the 
SPMA live in the São Paulo City. 
Within a column, estimates should be compared across panels. Comparing the stripped-down 
models results are, if anything, stronger (-0.877 versus -0.616 in column (1)). In terms of the 
benchmark model results are again stronger (-0.668 versus -0.490). In column (3) we include the state-
level enforcement variables. Results are again unchanged. 
Table 6 has a long list of robustness checks. Column (1) has the benchmark estimate for 
comparison (table 5, Panel A, column (2)). In column (2) we estimate the model by OLS without 
weights to check whether the weighting procedure is driving results. The point estimate is similar but 
the estimated standard errors are larger under OLS, confirming the efficiency of the weighting scheme.  
Column (3) deals with the econometric challenges posed by including the lags of the dependent 
variable as regressors. The fixed-effect transformation does not work if N is large and T small, unless 
the error term is strictly exogenous, which rules out unobserved serial correlation. Since in our case N 
is small and T is large, OLS has small bias but Monte Carlo experiments suggest that both large N and 
very large T are necessary. Despite complications in identifying models with fixed-effects and lagged 
dependent variables, we implement a GMM procedure that instruments for the lags of homicide with 
further lags of homicide (Arellano and Bond (1991)).
7 Results are stronger than the benchmark. Thus, 
any bias caused by inclusion of lags of the dependent variable is towards zero, if anything. 
Adopting cities were more violent than in non-adopting cities around the period of adoption. 
Thus mean reversion may be driving results. In columns (4) and (5) we allow each city to have its own 
linear trend θit. Results are again similar, both with and without dynamics. Finally, results are similar 
when the model is estimated in logs (column (6)): dry laws cause a 15% reduction in homicides.  
Figure 4 presents the coefficients of a different specification. Treatment is coded as a set of 
dummies for the number of months to the introduction of the law. A total of 36 dummy coefficients are 
                                                 
 
7 A wide range of possible specifications for the Arellano-Bond estimator is available. For conciseness reasons, and because this is only 
one of the many robustness check, we do not dwell into the several implications of different estimation methods. We implement the 
standard version on the STATA package. All variables are first-differenced, the one-step estimator for the standard deviation is used and 
Ti –  p – 2 lags are used as instruments for the p included lagged dependent variable. Only one slight modification: four lags (the p) of the 
dependent variable are included (instead of two).   15
estimated, 18 for the months before and 18 for after the law. The sample is restricted to 18 months 
before and after adoption. Two patterns arise. Before adoption, the estimated dummies are all zero, 
except for the 12
th month before adoption, a positive outlier. At the month of adoption, we estimate a 
big negative coefficient on the dummy. For subsequent months, estimated dummy coefficients 
fluctuate around -1, in line with the hypothesis that dry law had a causal impact on homicide.  
 
5.2 Distribution of Crime over the Day 
 
Report-level data from INFOCRIM provide additional evidence that dry laws worked. Cities 
enter the sample as INFOCRIM was implemented at its precincts but not all precincts within a city 
enter at the same time. Thus levels are not comparable over time. For this reason, we use report-level 
data to compare the distribution of crime throughout the day in adopting and non-adopting cities before 
and after adoption. We have INFOCRIM data for 10 adopting cities (Barueri, Diadema, Embu, Embu-
Guaçu, Ferraz de Vasconcelos, Itapecerica, Jandira, Mauá, Osasco e Suzano). São Paulo City is the 
control group. 
The estimation strategy is as follows. An observation is a homicide (indexed by j). Let i be a 
city, and d be a day. The dependent variable is multinomial: 
 
⎪
⎪
⎩
⎪
⎪
⎨
⎧
=
59pm : 10   and   00pm : 7 between    commited    was   homicide    the if   , 3
59pm : 6   and   00pm : 1 between    commited    was   homicide    the if   , 2
59pm : 12   and   00am : 7 between    commited    was   homicide    the if   , 1
59am : 6   and    00pm : 11 between    commited    was   homicide    the if   , 0
j
j
j
j
H jid  
 
ALjid is 1 if city i had a dry law in effect in day d. We run a multinomial logit regression of Hjid 
on ALjid with baseline category being 3. We then compute the predicted probabilities for AL = 1 and 0. 
Typically, curfews are from 11:00pm to 6:00am. Thus, we expect that the proportion of homicides 
committed in the late night-early morning period to fall following adoption. We also expect the 
proportion of homicides in the evening (7pm to 22:59pm) to increase because these are now the busiest 
bar hours.  
Results are in table 7. Panel A shows that the presence of the dry law reduces by 7.5% the 
probability that the homicide was committed between 11pm and 6:59am. This impact is significant at 
the 10% level. The proportion of homicides in the evening increases (5.2%), but the impact is not   16
precisely estimated. In panel B São Paulo City is excluded. It is not surprising that the number of 
observations is dramatically reduced. Nonetheless, results are stronger, if anything. Now both expected 
effects arise: the share of late night-early morning homicides drops and evening share increases. 
 
5.3 Spillover Effects 
 
Adoption in a city may shift bar drinking to its non-adopting neighbours. Thus, the control 
group could be affected by the treatment, introducing additional challenges for causal inference. Table 
8 shows several specifications that measure the spillover effect and assess its consequences. Columns 
(1) through (3) present direct evidence on spillovers. The sample is restricted to non-adopting cities 
and adopting cities before adoption, the “control group”. The main variable of interest is the intensity 
of neighbour adoption, which is measured as: i) number of adopting neighbours, ii) % of adopting 
neighbours and (iii) % of adopting neighbour population. In all three cases, spillover effects are small 
and statistically insignificant. In column (4) the sample is full again. We interact the number of 
adopting neighbours with the presence of the dry law in the city. If spillovers are relevant, then 
whether a dry law neighbour comes across the boundary to drink will depend on whether the receiving 
city adopted the dry law. We expect the own law effect to be negative, the neighbours’ law positive 
(since it captures spillovers from neighbours if one does not have a law), and the interaction negative 
(undoing the positive neighbour effect). Only the own effect has the expected negative sign. The 
coefficient on the interaction is positive but insignificant. Moreover, the number of adopting 
neighbours seems to reduce homicides, although the coefficient is small in magnitude and statistically 
insignificant. Again, results suggest that spillover effects are not relevant. 
Despite their absence, we assess whether results are affected by spillovers. In columns (5) 
through (7) the sample is restricted to large cities, where it is more costly for drinkers go to bars in 
non-adopting neighbouring cities. In columns (5) and (6) the criteria for staying in the sample is 
population. Results are, if anything, stronger. However, physical size may be a better measure of the 
cost of moving around. In column (7) the estimated coefficient is slightly a smaller (-0.432) but still 
statistically and practically significant. In summary, spillovers do not affect our estimates. 
 
5.4 Validation Tests 
   17
Arguably, dry laws should have an impact on other outcome variables. As a validation exercise 
we measure the impact of dry law adoption on battery and deaths by car accidents. 
 
5.4.1 Impact of Dry Laws on Battery  
 
The newspaper story suggests that dry laws reduced fights. Thus, we expect them to reduce 
violent crimes other than murder. We test this conjecture by estimating the impact of dry laws on 
battery.
8 Table 9 presents some of the models in table 5. Columns (1) through (3) show that dry laws 
reduced battery, regardless of the inclusion of controls. Consider the full model estimate -2.175 in 
column (3). The coefficient means an 8% reduction in batteries due to adoption (see table 3), which 
resembles the impact on homicides. Results are robust to including state-level enforcement variables 
and to using only the staggered nature of adoption (columns (4) and (5), respectively).   
 
5.4.2 Impact of Dry Laws on Deaths by Car Accident 
 
Table 10 shows results for deaths by car accidents. The estimated coefficient in column (1)       
(-0.055) represents a 7% reduction in car accident deaths, an impact comparable to the one on 
homicides. However, the effect is not precisely estimated, which is not surprising for several reasons.  
Bar drinking relates to traffic fatalities more tenuously than it relates to homicides. Most bars 
are in the periphery, whose dwellers are poor and use the public transportation system. Thus, for the 
majority of bar drinkers car accidents are irrelevant simply because they do not own a car. The 
geography of the relationship between bar drinking and deaths by car accident is also unfavourable. It 
is unclear whether an accident will happen at the city where the bar is located, or somewhere else. The 
odds that the homicide will be committed nearby are higher because committing homicides do not 
imply driving. Hospital data is also problematic. The victim may end up in hospital in a city other then 
where the bar is located or the accident took place. Finally, if a victim is declared dead at the scene, she 
goes directly to the morgue and does not show up in the hospital data.
9  
                                                 
 
8 Battery is actual physical violence. Assault is defined as the threat of violence. The Brazilian Penal Code does not have 
the assault category, only Lesão Corporal Dolosa (“Bodily Injury with Intent”), which in Common Law is battery.  
9 Adams and Cotti (2008) show that smoking restrictions in the US caused an increase in deaths by car accidents because 
people drove longer distances to go to bars in counties without smoking restrictions. The same could apply here, although 
this effect is second order because most bar drinkers do not drive in the SPMA.    18
To mitigate the fact that accidents may happen outside the adopting cities limits, we discard the 
smallest half of adopting cities in terms of area. Results are now stronger and precisely estimated. In 
column (3), we also discard the smallest half of non-adopting cities. Results are similar but precision is 
lost due to the small number of observations. Including state-level enforcement variables does not 
change any conclusion. 
 
5.5 Falsification Tests 
 
Some crimes should not be affected by the dry law. If they are, we would suspect that the 
estimated impact of the dry law is spurious and may be attributed to other unobserved policies. Thus 
they serve as falsification tests. We use three categories: vehicle, bank and cargo robbery.  
 
5.5.1 Impact of Dry Laws on Vehicle Robbery 
 
Vehicle robbery is our preferred falsification category for several reasons. First, it does not 
suffer from under-reporting. Accuracy, however, does not imply that it is a good falsification category. 
If it was an impulsive crime it would be affected by dry laws. It is hard to argue that the dampening 
inhibition effect of alcohol does not induce all sorts of bad behaviours. Differently from homicides, 
however, alcohol consumed socially should not have a pronouncedly larger impact on vehicle robbery.  
It is well-known (but hard to quantify) that in the SPMA vehicle robbery is a professional 
crime, driven by the secondary market for parts and, to a less extent, by smuggling to neighbouring 
states and countries, which is hardly an impulsive type of crime. The same argument applies for 
vehicle  theft, but robbery is a better falsification category because, by definition, it involves an 
imminent threat to life, normally with the presence of weapon. Thus, the victim must be present and 
the crime occurs mainly during hours when people are circulating in the streets. Panel A of figure 5 
shows that only 20% of robberies occur during the hours in which the dry laws are “binding”. Most 
vehicle robberies occur in the evening rush hour when dry laws are not binding. In contrast, panel B 
shows that 36% vehicle theft occur during the dry law hours (11pm-6am), which is also the mode of 
the distribution. This is unsurprising because theft does not require threat, and the typical target is a 
vehicle parked in a dark empty street, i.e., late night and early morning, when dry laws are binding.  
Panel A of table 11 shows some of the models we estimated for homicides. In column (1) we 
report the stripped down model. The impact of dry law is negative but insignificant statistically and   19
practically (compare the point estimate with the means in table 3). In column (2) we add covariates and 
state-level enforcement variables. The impact is now positive but again insignificant statistically and 
practically. Column (3) adds the lags of homicide and again we find no impact on vehicle robbery. 
Column (4) has the un-weighted OLS estimate, with similar results.  
 
5.5.2 Impact of Dry Laws on Bank and Cargo Robbery 
 
Besides vehicle robberies, we have monthly data from Jan-2001 onwards on bank and cargo 
robbery, two good categories for falsification tests. Bank and cargo robbery should not be affected by 
dry laws because both are professional crimes. Bank robberies are complex ventures, which involve 
planning. Cargo robbers need a network of contacts to dispose of the merchandise in the market. Both 
bank and cargo robberies tend to be well measured because of insurance reasons. Finally, both 
categories occur mainly during the daytime. Panel C of figure 4 shows that 92% of bank robberies 
occur between 7am and 10pm, and 82% percent between 7am and 6pm. This is expected because by 
definition robberies must involve threat, and thus should almost always happen during bank opening 
hours. Cargo robberies have a similar distribution during the day (figure IV, panel D). Relative to 
vehicle robbery, bank and (to lesser extent) cargo robbery have the disadvantage of being less frequent, 
which reduces the power of the test. Panels B and C in table 11 have the estimates.  
Start in panel B. The impact of dry laws on bank robberies is never different from zero 
statistically, and the estimated coefficient is erratic, with oscillating sign. Bank robberies are very 
infrequent and the failure to estimate the impact of dry laws on bank robbery may be due to the low 
power of the test. Panel C has the estimated impact of dry laws on cargo robbery, which are more 
frequent than bank robbery. Again, we never reject the null hypothesis that the impact of dry laws is 
zero. The estimated coefficient in column (1), -0.205, is large when compared to the mean of cargo 
robbery in adopting cities before adoption (1.00 see table 3) but it is not statistically significant. 
Furthermore, the estimates are not robust to the inclusion of controls: in all other three columns the 
impact of cargo robbery is insignificant in practice as well as statistically.  
 
6. Conclusion 
 
At our benchmark estimate, dry laws cause monthly homicide rates per 100,000 inhabitants to 
fall by almost 0.5, which means a 10% reduction. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first   20
estimate of the impact of alcohol restrictions on bars and restaurants on violent crime accounting for 
endogeneity and that cannot be confounded with other policies or secular trends. 
Restricting opening hours has the advantage of being easily enforceable. Consider the 
enforcement of the minimum drinking age: it is much harder to monitor whether a bar sells alcohol to 
minors then verifying whether it is opened at certain hours. 
Our results provide a guarded support for policies that restrain the recreational consumption of 
alcohol. We use the word “guarded” because in different institutional settings results may not arise. 
Furthermore, our results are silent with respect to the welfare cost of dry laws. Finally, we have no data 
to assess potentially perverse effects of the law. In the UK, for example, police report data suggest an 
increase in violent behaviour right after 11pm, as pubs were closing (see Finey (2004)). A full cost-
benefit analysis should be conducted in order to assert confidently that opening hour restrictions are 
worth implementing as a public policy. 
Extrapolation to general alcohol consumption is not warranted. In fact, our results are not in 
contradiction with previous results in the economics of crime literature. Prohibition and taxation fail 
because they do not reduce consumption, and may shift consumption to heavier “psychotropic”. 
Restricting recreational consumption is less radical and more targeted than prohibition. The purpose is 
not to prevent people from drinking, but to make it difficult to do so in particularly dangerous settings. 
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Source: Secretaria de Segurança do Estado de São Paulo and Municipal Laws. Total number of 
homicide over the year at the city level was aggregated to the group level, adopting and non-adopting 
cities. 
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Source: Secretaria Estadual de Segurança do Estado de São Paulo. Common theft/robbery includes 
all categories except vehicle. Both theft/robbery categories are plot on the right axis. Homicides are 
plotted on the left axis. 
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Fig. 3. Geographical Distribution of Adoption   26
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Secretaria de Segurança do Estado de São Paulo, Fundação SEADE and Municipal 
Laws. Homicides are regressed on covariates (listed in note (a), table 5), four lags of homicides, 
city-specific trends and a treatment variable. Treatment is coded as a set of 37 dummies for 18 
months before the law, the month of adoption and 18 months subsequent to the adoption of the 
law. The figure shows the dummy coefficient estimates. Only 18 months before and after 
adoption included in sample for this regression. Only adopting cities included in this regression.  
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Source: Secretaria de Segurança Pública do Estado de São Paulo, INFOCRIM. Sample is 
composed of all homicides committed in the SPMA and recorded by INFOCRIM between 1999 
and 2003
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Table 1: Month of Dry Law Adoption    
City  Date of Dry Law 
Adoption  Closing Hours  Population in year 2004 
Barueri  Mar-01  11pm-6am all week  250,385 
Jandira  Aug-01  11pm-6am all week  105,024 
Itapevi  Jan-02  11pm-6am all week  193,475 
Diadema  Mar-02  11pm-6am all week  389,354 
Juquitiba  May-02 
11pm-6am weekdays, 2am-6am 
Fridays, Saturdays, Sundays and 
Holidays 
28,353 
São Lourenço da Serra  Jun-02  11pm-6am all week  14,915 
Suzano  Jun-02  11pm-5am all week  267,769 
Itapecerica  Jul-02  11pm-6am all week  149,977 
Mauá  Jul-02  11pm-6am all week  396,717 
Ferraz de Vasconcelos  Sep-02  11pm-6am all week  167,583 
Embu  Dec-02  11pm-5am all week  239,144 
Osasco  Dec-02  0am-5am all week  684,079 
Embu – Guaçu  Apr-03 
11pm-6am weekdays, 1am-6am 
Fridays, Saturdays, 0am-6am 
Sundays and Holidays 
60,696 
Vargem Grande Paulista  Dec-03  11pm-5am all week  40,083 
São Caetano  Jul-04 
11pm-6am weekdays, 0am-6am 
Fridays, Saturdays, Sundays and 
Holidays 
142,692 
Poá  Aug-04  11pm-4am all week  104,328 
Sources: Municipal Laws and IBGE.       
  
        
Table 2: The Mechanism and Substitution Effects    
Dependent variable: total monthly consumption of alcohol by type (in R$)   
   All sample 
Only 15-30 year-old 
males 
  Beer  Cachaça Beer  Cachaça 
  (1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
  In bars  In stores  In bars  In stores  In bars  In bars 
-28.554 11.572 -2.176 0.238 -66.210  -2.324 
SPMAx2003 
(6.382)***  (4.601)***  (1.073)** (0.367)  (41.675)  (1.370)* 
# Observations  5294 5294  4810  4810  721  638 
Source: Pesquisa de Orçamento Familiar (POF). Robust standard errors in parentheses. Omitted regressors are: dummy for SPMA 
excluding São Paulo City, dummy for 2003, age in years, log of income, years of schooling and dummy for gender. 
 *** = significant at the 1% level    
** = significant at the 5%    
* = significant at the 10%.         29
Table 3: Summary Statistics, Adopting and non-Adopting Cities 
  
Adopting (16 cities)   non-Adopting (23 
cities)     non-Adopting 
excl. São Paulo 
  
6-month 
period 
pre-
adoption 
6-month 
period 
post-
adoption 
  
6-month 
period 
pre-
adoption 
6-month 
period 
post-
adoption 
  
6-month 
period 
pre-
adoption 
6-month 
period 
post-
adoption 
Monthly Crime Rate per 100thd inhabitants               
4.83  2.24    4.29  2.40    3.89  2.23 
Homicide 
(3.00)  (1.11)    (0.94)  (0.56)    (1.66)  (0.97) 
 31.78  18.85    44.51  30.80    42.00  25.43 
Vehicle Robbery 
(16.96)  (12.11)    (17.13)  ( 12.95)    (31.43)  (22.81) 
26.82  26.69    24.07  30.19    28.43  32.29 
Battery 
(7.03)  (11.14)    (6.40)  (7.22)    (10.42)  (12.61) 
0.72  0.48    0.56  0.60    0.42  0.41 
Deaths by Car Accident  
(0.79)  (0.52)    (0.33)  (0.35)    (0.58)  (0.59) 
1.00  1.40    1.37  2.49    1.38  1.61 
Cargo Robbery 
(0.94)  (1.32)    (0.74)  (0.98)    (1.31)  (1.31) 
0.01  0.05    0.07  0.14    0.03  0.05 
Bank Robbery 
(0.04)  (0.23)    (0.15)  (0.12)    (0.26)  (0.16) 
Demographics                   
176  201    639   683    199  227  Population (in thousands) 
(156)  (167)    (208)  (216)    (260)  (292) 
14.63  14.15    13.99  13.14    14.35  14.05  %Male Population, age 15-30 
(0.67)  (0.92)    (0.41)  (0.72)     (0.62)  (0.76) 
Educational Attainment (in year 2000)                 
11.01    10.08    9.89  High-school drop-out rate (in %) 
(2.87)    (1.23)    (2.23) 
7.19    8.10    7.47  Average number of years of 
schooling (age 15-64)  (0.75)    (0.60)     (0.77) 
Income in 2004 reais                    
10045  13165    10233  13023    8811  11484 
Income per capita 
(6425)  (6990)    (2242)  (9317)     (3778)  (5523) 
Source: Secretaria de Segurança do Estado de São Paulo, Fundação SEADE and Municipal Laws. Except for population, all 
means are computed using population as a weight. Standard deviations in parentheses. Pre-adoption period is Jul-99/Dec-99; 
post-adoption period is Jul-04/Dec-04. The observation from Poá in Jul-04 was excluded from the post-adoption in adopting 
cities. 
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Table 4: Log Normal Duration Regression of Adoption of Dry Law 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
  
Dynamics of Homicides 
Marginal Effects  
      0.035  0.045  0.086 
Homicides t - 1 
      (0.061)  (0.083)  (0.079) 
      -0.083  -0.090  -0.067 
Homicides t - 2        (0.079)  (0.103)  (0.099) 
      -0.040  -0.036  -0.005 
Homicides t - 3        (0.069)  (0.092)  (0.088) 
      0.002  0.008  0.051 
Homicides t - 4 
      (0.063)  (0.084)  (0.080) 
Competing Municipal Policies                
   0.517  0.512     0.829  Dummy for the Presence of a Municipal 
Police Force     (0.401)  (0.384)     (0.488)* 
   -0.107  -0.068     -0.205  Dummy for the Presence of a Municipal 
Secretary of Justice     (0.325)  (0.322)     (0.480) 
   0.041  0.031     0.062 
Log(Size of Police Force per capita) 
   (0.075)  (0.069)     (0.091) 
   -0.215  -0.200     -0.283 
Log(Education Spending per capita) 
   (0.303)  (0.283)     (0.036) 
   0.342  0.335     0.411 
Log(Welfare Spending per capita) 
   (0.002)  (0.221)     (0.259)* 
Competing State Policies                
   0.284  0.286     -0.003 
Log(Prison per capita) 
   (0.403)  (0.376)     (0.488) 
   -0.448  -0.440     -0.515 
Log(Number of Policemen per capita) 
   (0.206)**  (0.199)***     (0.235)**
   -0.147  -0.109     0.128 
Log(Guns Aprehended per capita) 
   (0.337)  (0.316)     (0.462) 
Demographic controls                
0.510  0.324  0.257  0.478  0.162 
Log(City Level GDP per capita) 
(0.346)  (0.336)  (0.320)  (0.339)  (0.401) 
1.772  2.612  2.124  1.311  0.330 
Log(Population) 
(3.964)  (3.196)  (2.997)  (3.954)  (3.779) 
-2.145  -2.972  -2.416  -1.629  -0.545 
Log(Male Population, 15 and 30 years) 
(4.040)  (3.266)  (3.068)  (4.041)  (3.843) 
Time Trends                
Time  -15.958  -10.265  -8.832  -15.271  -14.959   31
(12.808)  (9.933)  (9.300)  (12.589)  (0.118) 
0.027  0.017  0.015  0.026  0.025 
(Time)
2 
(0.022)  (0.017)  (0.016)  (0.022)  (0.021) 
1185.235  766.387  661.159  1134.459  1110.041 
Log(Time) 
(919.776)  ( 714.433)  (669.410)  (904.265)  (852.040)
0.196  0.173  0.161  0.184  0.128 
Number of Adopting Neighbours 
(0.117)*  (0.126)  (0.971)*  (0.113)*  (0.150) 
Time Invariant Controls                
0.389  0.300  0.311  0.406    
Base Line Homicides 
(0.140)*** (0.124)*** (0.135)***  (0.158)***   
Pseudo-R
2  0.088  0.148  0.159   0.095   0.112 
Source: Secretaria Estadual de Segurança Pública de São Paulo,  Fundação SEADE, and Municipal Laws.    
Sample period is Jan-2001 through Dec-2004; all five specifications have 1469 observations. Standard errors in parentheses. 
*** significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level,* significant at the 10% level. All variables divided by 100. 
                 
 
 
Table 5: Main Estimates  
Dependent Variable: Homicides per 100thd inhabitants 
   Full Sample  Jan-01 to Dec-04 
   Panel A: adopting and non-adopting cities 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
-0.616  -0.490  -0.605  -0.613 
AdoptLaw   (0.342)*  (0.210)**  (0.252)**  (0.245)** 
Covariates?
(a)  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
4 Lags of Homicide?  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Enforcement Variables?
(b)  No  No  No  Yes 
# Observations  2535  2535  1872  1872 
   Panel B: Only adopting cities 
-0.877  -0.668  -0.649  -0.654 
AdoptLaw   (0.309)***  (0.291)**  (0.362)*  (0.381)* 
Covariates?
(a)  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
4 Lags of Homicide?  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Enforcement Variables?
(b)  No  No  No  Yes 
# Observations  1040  1040  768  768 
Source: Secretaria Estadual de Segurança Pública de São Paulo,  Fundação SEADE, and Municipal 
Laws. 
 *** = significant at the 1% level, ** =  significant at the 5%, * = significant at the 10%. 
In all specifications, observations are weighted according to population. Standard Errors in parentheses 
are clustered at the city level. Period of Analysis is May-1999 through December-2004, unless otherwise 
noted. All specifications contain a full set of period (month) and city dummies.   32
(a): Covariates include: logs of population, of income per capita, of the number of 15-30 year-old males, 
the number of neighbouring cities that adopted the law, a dummy for the presence of a municipal 
secretary of justice, a dummy for the presence of a municipal police force and log of its size, the log of 
the municipal per capita spending on education, and the log of the municipal per capita spending on 
welfare programs. 
(b): yearly data on the number of guns apprehended per capita, the number of prisons per capita and the 
number of police officers per capita 
 
 
                
Table 6: Robustness Checks       
Dependent Variable:  Homicides per 100thd inhabitants  Log of 
Homicides
 
WLS OLS  Arellano-
Bond  WLS WLS  WLS 
  (1) (2)  (3)  (4) (5)  (6) 
-0.490  -0.406 -0.536 -0.583 -0.433  -0.152  AdoptLaw  
(0.210)** (0.245)* (0.206)*** (0.291)** (0.244)* (0.059)***
4 Lags of Homicide?  Yes Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes 
City-specific Trends?§  No No No Yes  Yes No 
# Observations  2535 2535  2496  2535 2535  1573 
Source: Secretaria Estadual de Segurança Pública de São Paulo, Fundação SEADE and Municipal Laws.  
 *** = significant at the 1% level, ** = significant at the 5%, * = significant at the 10% 
WLS = Observations weighted by population as in table 5. OLS = Observations un-weighted. Standard Errors in 
parentheses are clustered at the city level Period of Analysis is May-1999 through December-2004. Arellano-Bond 
GMM procedure, four lags included (p), dependent variable and regressors are first-differences, one-stage standard 
deviations, Ti - p - 2 lags of the dependent variable used as instruments. No weights included. All specifications 
include the set of covariates as in table 5. All specifications contain a full set of period (month) and city dummies. 
§: One linear trend (θit) for each city i in the sample (city dummies interacted with time). 
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Table 7: Impact of Dry Law Adoption on the Distribution of Crime over 
the Day 
Dependent Variable: Hour of the Day = 0, 1, 2 and 3. Baseline category = 3 
Multinomial Logit Effect on the Predicted Probabilities
   Panel A: São Paulo included 
                                  -0.075 
   0 (between 11:00pm and 6:59am)   (0.045)* 
 
0.016     
    1 (between 7:00am and12:59pm)  (0.036) 
                                  
                                   0.007 
    
    2 (between 13:00pm and 6:59pm) 
  (0.039) 
 
                                   0.052     3 (between 7:00pm and 10:59pm) 
(0.048) 
Observations  23885 
   Panel B: São Paulo excluded 
-0.118 
   0 (between 11:00pm and 6:59am)  (0.073)* 
 
-0.043     
    1 (between 7:00am and12:59pm)       (0.066)      
 
0.019  
    
    2 (between 13:00pm and 6:59pm) 
   (0.067) 
 
0.142     3 (between 7:00pm and 10:59pm) 
                                   (0.761)* 
Observations  145 
Source: INFOCRIM and Municipal Laws.  
Coefficients represent the difference in predicted probabilities with and without the presence of the dry law 
that a homicide occurred in a given hour of the day. 
*** = significant at the 1% level, ** = significant at the 5%, * = significant at the 10%.  Standard errors in 
parentheses. An observation is a homicide. Sample is composed of observations from Barueri, Diadema, 
Embu, Embu-Guaçu, Ferraz de Vasconcelos, Itapecerica, Jandira, Mauá, Osasco e Suzano and the city of São 
Paulo. AL = AdoptLaw. Baseline category is H = 3 (hours between 7pm and 10:59pm)   34
Table 8: Spillover Effects 
Dependent Variable: Homicides per 100thd inhabitants       
 
non-
adopting 
and 
adopting 
before 
non-
adopting 
and 
adopting 
before 
non-
adopting 
and 
adopting 
before 
Whole 
Sample 
Population 
>100,000 
Population 
>200,000  Largest Areas 
 (1)  (2) (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
     -0.735  -0.573  -0.812  -0.432 
AdoptLaw       (0.258)***  (0.231)**  (0.298)**  (0.189)** 
     0.238       
Interaction       (0.204)       
-0.028     -0.028       
Number of Adopting Neighbours 
(0.022)     (0.048)       
  0.004         
% Adopting Neighbours 
  (0.003)          
    0.001       
% Adopting Neighbouring Population  
      (0.002)             
# Observations   1495   1495   1495  2535 1008 528  1536 
Source: Secretaria Estadual de Segurança Pública de São Paulo, Fundação SEADE and Municipal Laws. 
 *** = significant at the 1% level, ** = significant at the 5%, * = significant at the 10%. Weighted Least Squares procedure with population as weights. In columns (1) 
through (3) the period of Analysis is May-1999 through December-2004. In columns (4) through (7) they it is May-1999 through December-2004 Observations are 
clustered at the city level. City and period (month) dummies, four lags of homicides and covariates as defined in table 5 included in all specifications. 
 
   35
 
 
 
 
 
 
                 
Table 9: Battery 
Dependent Variable: Battery per 100thd inhabitants 
  
All 
Sample 
All 
Sample 
All 
Sample 
All 
Sample 
Only 
Adopters 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
-4.419  -3.601  -2.175  -2.301  -2.159 
AdoptLaw   (2.292)*  (1.359)*** (0.664)***  (0.642)*** (0.708)***
4 Lags of Battery?  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Covariates?  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Enforcement Variables?  No  No  No  Yes  Yes 
# Observations  1716  1716  1716  704  704 
Source: Secretaria Estadual de Segurança Pública de São Paulo,  Fundação SEADE and Municipal Laws 
 *** = significant at the 1% level, ** = significant at the 5%, * = significant at the 10%. Weighted Least Squares with 
population as weights. Observations are clustered at the city level. Covariates are as defined in table 5. All specifications 
include city and period dummies. Sample is May-2001/December-2004 unless otherwise noted. 
 
           
  
 
    
Table 10: Deaths in Car Accidents       
Dependent Variable: Deaths by Car Accidents per 100thd inhabitants       
  
Whole Sample 
Only largest 
Adopters and 
all non-
adopters 
Only largest 
adopters and 
non-adopters 
Only largest 
adopters and 
all non-
adopters 
Only largest 
adopters and 
non-adopters 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
-0.055  -0.116  -0.108  -0.119  -0.110 
AdoptLaw   (0.048)  (0.053)**  (0.071)  (0.082)  (0.086) 
4 Lags of Deaths by Car Accident?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Covariates?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Enforcement Variables?  No  No  No  Yes  Yes 
# Observations  2535  2080  1430  1536
(a)  1056
(a) 
Source: DATASUS, Fundação SEADE and Municipal Laws. All specifications include a full set of city and period dummies. 
Sample period runs from Jan-1999 through Dec-2004. 
(a): Sample runs from Jan-01 through Dec-04 
 *** = significant at the 1% level, ** = significant 5%, * = significant 10%. Weighted Least Squares with population as weights. 
Observations are clustered at the city level. Covariates are as defined in table 5, note (a). 
                   36
 
Table 11: Falsification Tests 
PANEL A: Dependent Variable: Vehicle Robbery per 100thd inhabitants 
   WLS  WLS  WLS  OLS 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
-0.260  1.896  0.735  0.125  AdoptLaw   (1.781)  (1.774)  (0.753)  (0.854) 
4 Lags of Vehicle Robbery?  No  No  Yes  Yes 
Covariates?  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Enforcement Variables?  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
PANEL B: Dependent Variable: Bank Robbery per 100thd inhabitants 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
-0.008  0.015  0.010  0.043  AdoptLaw   (0.018)  (0.029)  (0.025)  (0.043) 
4 Lags of Bank Robbery?  No  No  Yes  Yes 
Covariates?  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Enforcement Variables?  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
PANEL C: Dependent Variable: Cargo Robbery per 100thd inhabitants 
-0.205  0.046  0.035  0.137 
AdoptLaw   (0.243)  (0.166)  (0.114)  (0.135) 
4 Lags of Cargo Robbery?  No  No  Yes  Yes 
Covariates?  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Enforcement Variables?  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Source: Secretaria Estadual de Segurança Pública de São Paulo, Fundação SEADE and Municipal Laws 
*** = significant at the 1% level, ** = significant at the 5%, * = significant at the 10%. Observations are 
clustered at the city level. Covariates as defined in table 5. For all specifications the number of 
observations is 1716 in all specifications 
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